The recent turmoil in Israel has sparked flippant suggestions that the nation be split in two: a secular, modernizing state and a more traditional, nationalistic one. Are there really such deep divisions in the country?
Yes. But they are nothing new, and there is little indication that either side really wants a divorce. They will battle over household rules and how to raise the children, but neither is about to abandon the family farm.
In perspective, I wrote about the two Israels in my 1998 book The Jewish State (yeah, I know, not exactly an original title). “Traditional Israel,” I wrote then, “is more particularistic, primordial, communitarian, religious, conservative, and hawkish.” On the other hand, “civic Israel,’ the Israel invented in the century since Herzl, “is more universalist, modernist, cosmopolitan, secular, liberal, and dovish.”
Of course these are not perfect correlations. There are, for example, secular hawks and religious doves. But there are two corresponding major camps in Israeli politics, with the right and religious forces – traditional Israel – holding a slight majority since the 1977 “upheaval”. (Netanyahu and his allies won just 48 percent of the vote in the last election only because some on the right refuse to work with Bibi.)
There is a Biblical template for two Israels: the division into the northern and southern kingdoms. But this did not come about because of attempts to weaken the judicial system. And anyone trying to draw a line on today’s map between civic Israel and traditional Israel will have one hell of a time. It would not be enough to divide cities; even neighborhoods would be split.
The ongoing effort to eviscerate Israel’s judiciary has, of course, sharpened the conflict and driven some to fantasize about a divorce. Given the lack of a constitution, the Supreme Court is the bastion of civic Israel. If the Knesset is given unchecked power, it would open the door to traditional Israel imposing itself on the rest of the nation.
A critical question is where the Israeli army comes into this. Given almost universal miliary service (except for the haredim), the army reflects society in all its divisions. And this is seen in the prominence of many high-ranking miliary and intelligence figures in the protests.
Many Israelis understandably feel, from visible evidence around them, that traditional Israel is winning the demographic war and will dominate in the future. As I’ve argued here, this focus on the birth-rate alone does not tell the whole story; there are other trends also at work. Modernizing societies typically undergo secularization on a broad scale. Is Israel alone an exception?
Civic Israel has certainly demonstrated its vitality and resolve in the astounding protests of the last months, spreading to the military, business, and other sectors. Polls indicate that only one-quarter to one-third of Israelis are now in support of the proposed neutering of the Supreme Court. And if elections were held now, Netanyahu and his allies would lose their temporary majority by a wide margin.
In 1998 I wrote that, in traditional Israel, Israeli Jews identified as Jews first, while in civic Israel the primary identity was as Israelis. Interestingly, in a recent poll fewer than ten percent identified exclusively as either Jewish or Israeli. Nearly half said they were “mainly Jewish and also Israeli,” and almost as many said they were “mainly Israeli and also Jewish.” So maybe the split between the two Israelis is not as dire as it sometimes seems.
One aspect that is difficult to measure even as it seems part of the dynamic is the extent to which the legislation and policies backed by the Hareidi MKs and Ministers represent the will of the Hareidi population. This is particularly true for the UTJ. The UTJ MKs and Ministers are chosen by their Rabbinical leaders. The Rabbinical leaders want policies that maximize their control over their communities. There is credible evidence that ordinary Hareidi men would like a more mdern education--Belz had agreed to use the core curriculum. Many want to work and improve the standard of living of their households. Also, even if the demographic threat is not realized, it has become and element in the political discourse. I imagine when a future government is not quite as beholden to the Hareidim as is the current one, there may be policies introduced that are designed to try to hold down family size by reducing subsidies and providing incentives for joining the work force. In other words, Lieberman is not going to appear holding such a radical position on this matter.