Perspective 124. The Israel-Hamas War: Avoidable?

Perspective 124. The Israel-Hamas War: Avoidable?

The fifth war between Israel and Hamas enters its fourth week, with the worst yet to come. As with any such repetitious calamity, a sense of inevitability seeps in. But was there a credible course that might have avoided this catastrophe?

Yes. At one time a solid majority among both Israelis and Palestinians accepted the same basic framework for resolution of their century-long conflict. The details were yet to be worked out, but the idea of two states seemed to be the future path. Then the extremists on both sides went to work.

In perspective, after the Interim Agreement (Oslo II) was concluded in September 1995, support for the peace process in Israel registered as high as 73 percent. Support among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was reliably recorded at 72 percent. Around that time I wrote that “it is possible that we are in the last stage of the Arab-Israel conflict.” I was not alone in this happy thought. But we were all wrong.

In short order came the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and during the subsequent Israeli election campaign Palestinian terrorists launched four attacks in nine days, helping to tip the balance in favor of hawkish newcomer Benjamin Netanyahu. Then came the collapse of the Camp David/Taba talks, the second intifada, a wave of suicide bombings in Israel, the Hamas victory in 2006 Palestinian elections, the 2006-07 Israel-Hizballah war, the Hamas take-over of Gaza and the four subsequent wars there. All of this was accompanied by the growth of Jewish settlements and settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.

On the eve of the October 7 massacre, then, support for the two-state solution had fallen to 32 percent among Palestinians and 35 percent among Israelis.

To reverse Hamas control of Gaza, after 2007 Israel and Egypt (also fighting Islamic extremists) instituted a blockade designed in theory to allow humanitarian relief to the civil population but weaken Hamas militarily and governmentally. Obviously this failed. Civilians did suffer, but Hamas remained in control and able to commit massive atrocities in Israel.

Does this mean that a strategy of undermining Hamas was doomed to failure? Not necessarily. Some rather arresting poll results, from two reputable survey organizations, show that even after 16 years of control and four wars with Israel there was room for alternatives to Hamas among the Gaza population. The surveys, from the days immediately preceding October 7, show that only 27 percent preferred Hamas to other parties, and that 72 percent viewed Hamas as corrupt. Fully 73 percent indicated preference for a peaceful solution to the conflict, with only 20 percent opting for a military solution aimed at the destruction of Israel. Rather strikingly, only 16 percent blamed externally imposed blockade for their economic hardships.

Gazans’ view of the Palestinian Authority (PA), governing some 40 percent of the West Bank, is not much better. Some 67 percent favor the resignation of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. The bottom line is that Palestinians, both in Gaza and in the West Bank, have little confidence in Hamas or the PA. Maybe that’s not surprising. But it means there is room for an alternative, such as a reformed and reinvigorated PA that, like the PA of the 1990s, pursued a peaceful settlement with an Israeli government likewise committed to a two-state solution.

Unfortunately, this Israeli partner has not existed. Since his return to power in 2009, Netanyahu has pursued a policy of keeping the Palestinians divided by keeping Hamas in business in Gaza. Though formally committed in2009 to a highly-conditional two-state solution, Netanyahu has in fact done nothing in furtherance of that outcome and has acted to weaken the PA by undercutting the blockade of Gaza, and keeping Hamas in business, as an excuse to avoid serious negotiations that would lead to Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank.

Testimonies from those who have worked over these years with Netanyahu – ministers, chiefs of staff, and heads of intelligence – leave little doubt about this consistent strategy. The blockade of goods has been loosened to allow construction materials useful to Hamas. Israel has permitted the delivery of suitcases of cash from Qatar to Hamas. Prisoners have been released, work permits increased, and targeted killings vetoed. Efforts toward PA-Hamas reconciliation have been discouraged. Cabinet discussions of “draining the swamp” in Gaza were canceled.

In short, any chance that the blockade might help return Gaza to PA control was systematically countered by Netanyahu’s push in the opposite direction. As he himself said to fellow Likud members, “Anyone who opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state needs to support the transfer of the money from Qatar to Hamas. In that way, we will foil the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

Netanyahu is now reaping the results of his own short-sighted policy. Tragically many Israelis, and many more Palestinians, will pay the price with their lives. When it’s over, maybe the dismal chapter of Bibi’s reign will also be over. But will the sheer brutality of it also bolster the Hamas grip on power, despite its previously vulnerable hold?

Common sense calls for supporting the more moderate elements on the other side. If Israel returns to common sense, it will move to strengthen the PA and restore its previous position as a partner in negotiating the establishment of a fully independent and sovereign Palestinian state.