Perspective 131. When Fighting Ends: Options to Israeli Occupation?

Israel aims to eliminate Hamas as a military threat. But long-term Israeli rule over Gaza would not diminish it as a political force. In fact, it was Israeli occupation that nurtured the rise of Hamas. Are there other options for post-war Gaza – and the West Bank – that would block both a repeat of October 7 and the pitfalls of renewed Israeli occupation?

Yes. In perspective, some of the most bloody passages in this conflict have opened the door to positive steps forward. The 1973 war, a previous case of Israel being caught by surprise due to a fixed “conception,” was followed a few years later by peace with Egypt. The first intifada, beginning in 1987, brought about a shift of opinion that made the Oslo process possible. It sometimes takes a trauma to shake people loose from fixed but faulty assumptions.

When U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warns that Israel should not occupy Gaza after the war, he is correct. It would be a quagmire for Israel, and a roadblock for any efforts to forge a more hopeful future.

And when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismisses the notion of putting the Palestinian Authority, under Mahmoud Abbas, in immediate control of post-war Gaza, he is also (for once) correct. The PA, deeply corrupt and in deep disrepute among its own people (88 percent wanting Abbas to resign), is in no position to take receivership of Gaza in the wake of Israeli tanks. Even the PA agrees with this.

So where does that leave us? This is where international institutions and actors have a role to play. Gaza needs a transitional authority that can establish order as Israeli forces withdraw and before Hamas can rearm. Such an authority would also need to oversee the massive humanitarian rescue and rebuilding needed, with the support of wealthy Arab states who would not subsidize Gaza under Israeli control. It will need to ensure that the relief goes to those who need it and not to the military reconstruction of Hamas.

Observers have suggested a UN trusteeship, or deployment of NATO forces, or some other international intervention. There are models for this kind of peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. One scenario envisions troops from Arab countries, but this is unlikely. Many of these states want Hamas neutered, but will avoid any association with the process by which such neutering takes place.

Whatever the exact form, an international presence would gain legitimacy among Palestinians by tying its presence to a pathway toward a two-state resolution – something that most Palestinians have accepted in the past. The overall strategy is to drive a wedge between the Gaza civilian population and the rejectionists of Hamas. The perpetrators of October 7 deserve to be targeted, but not the vast majority of the population behind whom they hide.

A trusteeship or transitional authority in Gaza could also, in theory and over time, be extended to West Bank areas controlled by the PA. And here comes a powerful idea: elections! Hamas has held no elections in Gaza, and the PA has not held any elections since its dismal loss to Hamas in 2006 legislative elections. Suppose the transitional authority conducted free and fair elections, open to any Palestinian party willing to lay down its arms and commit to a two-state framework.

In this regard, once again, let’s be clear. Destroying Hamas as a political force is not possible. What is possible is to convince most Palestinians that the Hamas program of armed struggle, of destroying Israel by force, is hopeless. Israel is here to stay (as are the Palestinians). At least one Hamas leader has just declared that it might be time to accept Israel’s existence; maybe this is a sign of the future? (There was a time when the PLO rejected the two-state solution.)

Out of elections could come a “renovated” PA, legitimized by the elections and gaining support because of the renewed likelihood of a Palestinian state. Israel could further the process by releasing Marwan Barghouti, a PLO figure convicted of violence, from prison. Polls show Barghouti to be the most popular Palestinian leader, someone with the credibility to lead a more credible PA.

The moving force behind this would have to be the United States. Joe Biden would have to make use of his popularity in Israel to bang heads together, blocking long-term Israeli occupation of Gaza and forcing Israel to contain the violence of West Bank Jewish settlers toward their Arab neighbors. There would also have to be some tough love toward the PA, forcing it to clean up its act.

But will any of this take place under the current Israeli government? No, not a chance. So it’s clear what the first order of business has to be.