Perspective 137. The Two-State Solution: DOA?

Perspective 137. The Two-State Solution: DOA?

The Israel-Hamas war has revived a push for establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But the two-state solution is currently rejected by the government of Israel, by Hamas, and – in recent polls – by a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians. Is this an idea that is, as many observers claim, no longer viable?

No. The basic logic and appeal of two states for two peoples have guaranteed its persistence over the course of the conflict. While it is moribund at present, it is still premature to pronounce its obituary.

In perspective, the partition of Palestine into two states has been on the table formally since it was proposed by the British Peel Commission in 1937. It has been the dominant model in United Nations proceedings since the passage of the UN partition resolution in 1947; in 2012 the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a non-member observer state. In 2002 the Arab League proposed recognizing Israel in the framework of a two-state settlement based on pre-1967 armistice lines. All major powers, including China and Russia, support the two-state model. So what is the problem?

The problem is that, despite broad international support, neither Israelis nor Palestinians have been totally on board. While a majority of both communities have favored two states at one time or another, this occurred simultaneously only during a brief period and that moment has passed.

Generally the party in the stronger position has dragged its feet on the issue of statehood for the other side. Before 1967 Palestinians and Arabs still rejected the very idea of a Jewish state, while Israel, threatened by the entire Arab world and in any event controlling only a little over half of Palestine, would have eagerly accepted a two-state solution. After 1967, Arabs including Palestinians gradually came to accept the idea of two states, giving birth to the “Oslo moment” in the history of the conflict.

In 1993 the dominant Palestinian movement recognized Israel and for a while a settlement based on two states seemed possible. The Oslo accords, and the subsequent “final status” talks of 200-01, 2007-08, and 2013-14 were all premised on the emergence of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. As late as 2002, 72 percent of both Palestinians and Israelis still subscribed to the two-state model.

But since then, events have undercut support on both sides. The outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, and violent attacks by Palestinian extremists over the following years, drove many Israelis into opposition to a state that would serve as a base for attacks. At the same time, Israel’s stronger position, after peace with Egypt and Jordan, made compromise with the Palestinians less urgent.

But the Palestinians were also drifting away, as they saw prospects for a viable Palestine state being undercut by continued expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank and growing violence by Jewish extremists there.

By December 2022, only 33 percent of Palestinians, and 34 percent of Israeli Jews, still supported the concept of two states.

But this drop in support was not so much a disbelief in the concept as it was a judgment on its feasibility. And the judgment on feasibility was in large measure because of widespread feeling (not totally unjustified) that the other side did not want a two-state solution. In other words, it was based on perceptions that could change if the other side were to demonstrate once again, convincingly, its acceptance of coexistence.

Apart from the demise of Hamas, this would require a different Israeli government, a reformed Palestine Authority, and some “tough love” from the international community (especially the United States). None of this is impossible; the first, a post-Bibi Israel, is practically certain. But, all in all, a return to two states is still highly uncertain.