Perspective 139. A Palestinian State: Only Viable Option?
The two-state solution – a Palestinian state alongside Israel – is currently rejected by majorities of both Palestinians and Israelis. Is it, nevertheless, the only realistic way out of the destructive Gaza war and the underlying impasse?
Yes. Neither Hamas nor Israel is a viable long-term ruler of Gaza. Something else will have to emerge, sooner or later. The framework actually already exists: the Palestinian Authority (PA) has legitimacy in Gaza by virtue of the Oslo accords, and it governed there for 13 years before being forcefully tossed out by Hamas. Despite the PA’s pitiful standing among Palestinians at present, it remains the logical candidate for eventual ruler of Gaza – and the core of a Palestinian state.
In perspective, Hamas control of Gaza will not endure beyond the current war. Israelis, supporters of Netanyahu’s government or not, are determined to break it militarily and as the government of Gaza. As a political movement it will continue to be an important force among Palestinians everywhere, but it has already lost an estimated one-third of its active fighters. As tragic as the cost may be, its hold on Gaza will be – at least temporarily – ended.
By the same token, long-term government of Gaza by Israel is not viable either. By one estimate it would take an estimated 40,000-100,000 troops as a permanent occupation force for Israel to maintain order. Polls show most Israelis have no wish to remain in Gaza, so long as the threat of another attack is eliminated. Some elements of the current government make noises to the contrary, but by all indications the current government will not outlast the war for very long.
After the war there will be a brutal accounting in which Netanyahu’s short-sighted maintenance of Hamas and weakening of the PA, in order to keep Palestinians divided, will spark a massive backlash. Most of the Israeli public are demanding elections, which in current surveys would replace Netanyahu – and his far-right allies – with a centrist government.
Who will take the place of Israeli troops in Gaza? Over the long run, logically, it would be non-Hamas Palestinian forces, even if this is not possible at first. Hamas does not have majority support among Palestinians, and as time passes many may recall how its hopeless program of “armed struggle” provoked the Israeli onslaught.
For the transition, proposals have been made for troops from moderate Arab states, or other nations supporting stability, perhaps under a UN flag. In the end, new elections in the West Bank and Gaza (none have been held since 2006) would give needed legitimacy to a restored PA – an institution that was itself a creation of the peace process. Such elections would be open only to those parties that endorse the peace process and the objective of a permanent two-state solution. If the prospect of Palestinian statehood is real, it will win the support of most Palestinians – as it did in the past when it seemed achievable. (The same is true regarding Israeli opinion.)
So the process requires new leadership on both sides – a daunting proposition. But it would have powerful international support, from Western nations and from the emerging Middle Eastern alignment of Arab states opposed to Iran and to radical Islamist movements like Hamas. Thomas Friedman envisions the coalescence of an international alliance with key roles played by Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia – which would, as part of this new Middle East, normalize relations with Israel and legitimize its acceptance by the broader Arab and Muslim world.
Again in perspective, Arab states have in fact been on record as offering to accept the permanence of Israel and peaceful relations with it since the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The catch was creation of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. It’s time for Israel to cash in on the offer.
The best way to avoid the return of Hamas, in short, is to provide a better alternative. In Friedman’s view, this is the best opportunity to do that since the collapse of the Oslo process.
Many will still insist that, in the end, it is still not viable. But it is clearly less unviable than the alternatives.