Perspective 74. If Putin Orders Nuclear Attack: Will His Order Be Carried Out?

There is no obvious endgame in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As frustration mounts in Vladimir Putin's feverish brain, some students of his psyche think that he might resort to tactical nuclear weapons before accepting defeat. Given that nuclear war would be suicidal for all involved, would saner minds in the Russian chain of command execute Putin's death wish?

Maybe not. At least twice during the Cold War, sober-minded Soviet (that is, Russian) military commanders prevented otherwise-mandated nuclear attacks that would have, in all likelihood, triggered nuclear war -- Mutual Assured Destruction, in the lovable jargon of the day.

In perspective, untold millions probably, and unknowingly, owe their lives to the common sense of two relatively unknown Russian officers: naval commander Vasily Arkhipov, in 1962, and Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, in 1983. Both bravely stood in the way of executing standing orders that would have led to a Soviet nuclear strike and, probably, general nuclear war.

Arkhipov was commander of a flotilla of four Soviet submarines dispatched to Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, each secretly armed with a nuclear torpedo. The submarines had permission to launch their torpedos against U.S. ships if they came under attack. All that was required was agreement of the captain and the political officer of each submarine -- except for Arkhipov's submarine, where his consent as detachment commander was also needed.

As it happens Arkhipov's submarine was detected by the U.S. Navy, which began dropping lightly-armed depth charges in order to force the submarine to surface. Since the submarine has been out of radio contact for days, the captain concluded war had begun and moved to launch the torpedo. The political officer agreed, but Arkhipov withheld his consent and was vindicated when the submarine finally surfaced to find that, happily, war had not broken out.

In 1983 Col. Petrov was in charge of a Soviet early-warning command center when report of an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile, launched from the U.S., came in. Strategic doctrine at the time ("launch on warning") called for an immediate launch of Soviet missiles before they could be destroyed by an incoming attack. But Petrov reasoned that there must be a glitch in the system: if the United States were trying to take out the Soviet nuclear force, they would have launched more than a single warhead. So he refused to pass on the warning to the Soviet forces ready to launch on warning.

Fortunately Petrov was right. Later on it was determined that the incoming missile was nothing more than a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds. But the incident laid bare the extreme risk of the hair-trigger alert that prevailed then -- and the importance of common sense as a restraint.

But there is no guarantee that common sense will prevail in any given situation. The incidents described show two sane military officers questioning whether circumstances justified following standing orders to attack. They did not involve the legitimacy of those standing orders themselves.

So if Putin were to give a "legitimate" order to use nukes -- would he be obeyed? God only knows.