Perspective 125. Crushing Hamas: Sufficient for the Moment?

Let us assume that Israel succeeds, at great cost in lives and against growing hostile international reaction, in removing Hamas from power and killing, capturing, or exiling its leaders. Will that buy a respite in the threat of violent attacks on its citizens?

No. By itself, military defeat of Hamas will at most transform the threat into the drumbeat of low-level violence that has characterized the history of the conflict. And in the long run it will do nothing to prevent the re-emergence of October 7-style threats.

In perspective, Hamas rule in Gaza was made possible by the failure to provide a viable path to Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in coordination with Israel. While Palestinian leaders – particularly Yasir Arafat – share in the blame for this failure, it would be short-sighted not to use the current disastrous war as an occasion to refigure the basic landscape of the conflict.

Israeli re-occupation of Gaza, in whole or in part, will do nothing in itself to stem the re-emergence of terrorism, particularly after the brutality of the war. There have been suggestions of introducing international forces and administration, perhaps under UN auspices, to supervise a transition to stable self-rule, perhaps under the Palestine Authority. But it is not clear which nations would be willing to lend troops to such an exercise, or how the PA – for now highly unpopular among Palestinians – would assume this challenging role.

How unpopular is the PA among Palestinians? In the most reliable recent poll, just before the war, 87 percent in the West Bank and Gaza said that the PA was corrupt. 78 percent on the West Bank and 79 percent in Gaza called for the resignation of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. The only comfort is that Hamas did not fare much better, at least before the war. 72 percent believed it was corrupt and only 27 percent chose it as “most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people.”

Would it be possible to rehabilitate the PA so that it could govern effectively in Gaza – and the West Bank? This would require a radical change of direction not just within the PA but also from Israel, which has systematically weakened the PA over time and made it into an object of scorn among its own people. It would require an Israeli government ready to bring the Jewish settlers on the West Bank under control and to pave the way toward a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

It would require, that is, a radical change in the Israeli government. Current polls suggest that the next Israeli government, whenever it comes, will be less extreme. But would that suffice? Probably not.

This is where refiguring the basic landscape of the conflict comes in. And refiguring the basic landscape is where the United States and its allies come in. It’s time, some have said, for some “tough love” or even a “shotgun wedding.” Great Powers used to settle such matters routinely and push their clients into accommodations that they might not have achieved on their own. Maybe it’s time for some good old-fashioned Great Power diplomacy.

Another poll of Gaza residents, before the war, showed that 72 percent still favored a peaceful resolution to the conflict. We have yet to see how the war changes these numbers. But there is a basis for hope that a strong hand from the outside will find something to work with. It’s time for some tough love toward both Israelis and Palestinians.