Let us assume that Israel succeeds, at great cost in lives and against growing hostile international reaction, in removing Hamas from power and killing, capturing, or exiling its leaders.
I associate, possibly incorrectly, the Islamic resistant fighters group Hamas with the city Hamas in Syria which the current despot's father leveled and killed everybody in it, leaving no children to grow up with burning hostilities towards the government. Hamas was ripe for an uprising which never happened as a result. After leveling the city to the ground he completely rebuilt everything and put a new population in it.
People only spoke of Hamas among trusted friends and when they did the conversation was along the lines of, Better 3 days of Hamas than 14 years of Lebanon.
Obviously that can't be done now with the whole world looking on, and shouldn't be. But it also means no outcome that will and terrorism towards Israel.
The city was Hama (no connection to Hamas), and Assad (the father) brutally put down the Muslim Brotherhood. But that didn't prevent the current civil war in its 13th year.
I disagree with a number of your propositions, but let me focus on just a few. I do not think it possible to sustain an argument about not giving the Palestinians a viable path to statehood since the Oslo Accords did just that and before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Palestinians had acquired lots of elements of statehood that violence rolled back. When Israel succeeded in curbing the violence, Palestinians were actually offered an even better deal in 2008. Every national movement has to figure out how to link the decisions made by leaders with the desires of the population whose interests the leaders presumably represent. Palestinian leaders have been more dispposed to rely on violence rather than broker the compromises that could win statehood. This has preserved the image of the Palestinians as ultimate victims and hence in need of large amounts of aid. Even if one assumes Israel succeeds, it is still too early to know if that means no larger war against Hizbullah, etc. But if the damage to Hamas leaders and weapons are massive, it is possible to imagine a coalition of Arab States--UAE, Egypt, even Jordan, the PA--working out an arrangement whereby incentives for recovery are coupled with severe punishments for any violence or disruptions. It will not be done overnight. It will probably take a decade. The same combination of a strong Israeli force deployed against terrorist networks on the West Bank combined with incentives to civil society groups interested in education, economiv development, etc. can build up the motivations and popular support for a state. Palestinians need a society that inculcates agency not dependence. As for the Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and even Likud extremists, they began their descent on 7 October. Their power is already curbed by Gantz, Eisenkot, and others. It is not a question of whether Bibi accepts responsibility. Conferring responsibility for this massive disaster is in the hands of Israeli voters.
Yes, the Palestinians missed chances -- I should have quoted Abbas on the mistake of Arafat in 2000. But I would also argue that since Netanyahu -- that is, 2009 -- Israel has made any accommodation increasingly difficult. On the other hand, we do seem to agree that the war could open up new possibilities.
Thanks for the clarification.
I associate, possibly incorrectly, the Islamic resistant fighters group Hamas with the city Hamas in Syria which the current despot's father leveled and killed everybody in it, leaving no children to grow up with burning hostilities towards the government. Hamas was ripe for an uprising which never happened as a result. After leveling the city to the ground he completely rebuilt everything and put a new population in it.
People only spoke of Hamas among trusted friends and when they did the conversation was along the lines of, Better 3 days of Hamas than 14 years of Lebanon.
Obviously that can't be done now with the whole world looking on, and shouldn't be. But it also means no outcome that will and terrorism towards Israel.
.
The city was Hama (no connection to Hamas), and Assad (the father) brutally put down the Muslim Brotherhood. But that didn't prevent the current civil war in its 13th year.
Your analysis makes sense, Alan. Thank you!
I disagree with a number of your propositions, but let me focus on just a few. I do not think it possible to sustain an argument about not giving the Palestinians a viable path to statehood since the Oslo Accords did just that and before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Palestinians had acquired lots of elements of statehood that violence rolled back. When Israel succeeded in curbing the violence, Palestinians were actually offered an even better deal in 2008. Every national movement has to figure out how to link the decisions made by leaders with the desires of the population whose interests the leaders presumably represent. Palestinian leaders have been more dispposed to rely on violence rather than broker the compromises that could win statehood. This has preserved the image of the Palestinians as ultimate victims and hence in need of large amounts of aid. Even if one assumes Israel succeeds, it is still too early to know if that means no larger war against Hizbullah, etc. But if the damage to Hamas leaders and weapons are massive, it is possible to imagine a coalition of Arab States--UAE, Egypt, even Jordan, the PA--working out an arrangement whereby incentives for recovery are coupled with severe punishments for any violence or disruptions. It will not be done overnight. It will probably take a decade. The same combination of a strong Israeli force deployed against terrorist networks on the West Bank combined with incentives to civil society groups interested in education, economiv development, etc. can build up the motivations and popular support for a state. Palestinians need a society that inculcates agency not dependence. As for the Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and even Likud extremists, they began their descent on 7 October. Their power is already curbed by Gantz, Eisenkot, and others. It is not a question of whether Bibi accepts responsibility. Conferring responsibility for this massive disaster is in the hands of Israeli voters.
Yes, the Palestinians missed chances -- I should have quoted Abbas on the mistake of Arafat in 2000. But I would also argue that since Netanyahu -- that is, 2009 -- Israel has made any accommodation increasingly difficult. On the other hand, we do seem to agree that the war could open up new possibilities.